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Maritime security in Indonesia: Towards a comprehensive agenda?

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ABSTRACT

Against the backdrop of Indonesian President Widodo's expressed intention to turn his country in to a maritime nation again, this article examines the way in which the Indonesian state understands and utilises the concept of maritime security. The article achieves this aim by discussing the results of a Training Needs Analysis of key Indonesian state maritime security actors, conducted as part of the first phase of a multi-stakeholder project examining how Indonesia's maritime security capacity can be improved.

The article illustrates how key maritime actors within the Indonesian state demonstrate a diverse understanding of what maritime security is, and argues that there is a demonstrable willingness on their part to look beyond a narrow conceptualisation of security in the maritime domain, which is solely focused on military threats and the defence of the state, towards something more comprehensive. Here the Indonesian approach to maritime security mirrors in practice conceptual trends encapsulated in the emergence of maritime security studies. The article concludes that there is the potential for a more comprehensive maritime security agenda to take hold in Indonesia but that this will require continued strategic and policy focus on the maritime domain within the country, alongside an emphasis on partnership building both within the state and between the state and non-state actors.

Consistent dialogue around how maritime security is conceptualised would be helpful in supporting these two conditions the article posits, elaborating the value of the human security lens for those interested in a more comprehensive approach to maritime security.

'We have to work as hard as possible to turn Indonesia into a maritime nation once again. Oceans, seas, straits and bays are the future of our civilization. We've turned our back on the seas, oceans, straits and bays for far too long. It is time for us to realize '*jalesveva jayamahe*,' 'in the ocean we triumph,' a motto upheld by our ancestors in the past. We want to make that happen again' President Joko Widodo, Inauguration Speech, 2014 [19].

1. Introduction

Indonesian President Joko Widodo's strategic emphasis on turning his country in to a "...maritime nation once again" [19] has ensured that the security of the maritime domain, alongside those efforts to enhance it, have been given greater prominence within the country over the past two years. This focus has arguably been given added impetus by the work of organisations such as the International Organization for MigrationIndonesia (IOMIndonesia) who have helped to shed light on incidents of trafficking on foreign fishing boats

operating in Indonesian waters, and in doing so have highlighted the tragic consequences for human welfare when criminality at sea flourishes. In one incident for example, an IOMIndonesia assessment conducted in the sprawling port of Ambon, identified hundreds of Myanmar nationals as victims of trafficking on foreign fishing boats ([16]:1). In a second incident hundreds of foreign fishermen, who had been victims of trafficking in the fisheries sector, were found stranded on the remote eastern island of Benjina. Predominantly foreign nationals from Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, the fishermen had experienced forced confinement and labour, non-payment of salaries despite their excessive working hours, and psychological and physical abuse amounting to torture ([16]:1).

Set against this backdrop a group of stakeholders – Indonesian state and non-state – came together in April 2015 to launch a project, ongoing today, titled 'The Consortium for Maritime Security in Indonesia'. The project's objective is to bring together varied stakeholders with an interest in security in the maritime domain, in order to build a community of practice ([3,6]:2) that can help contribute towards improving Indonesia's maritime security capacity. Its first phase, which ran between September 2015 and April 2016, recognised

the need to better understand how the Indonesian state thinks about maritime security – threats and responses. With a base level of understanding in place, the assumption was made that it would be possible to more effectively map out the most appropriate ways in which capacity could be improved, shaping the project's subsequent phases. This knowledge was attained through the delivery of several focus groups held in Indonesia involving key stakeholders and through the commission of a Training Needs Analysis (TNA) targeting key state maritime actors. It is this TNA that the paper focuses on, elaborating its development and results in order to provide an up to date case study of how the concept of maritime security is understood and utilised in practice today.

Whilst overall key maritime actors within the Indonesian state demonstrate a diverse understanding of what maritime security is, the paper argues that there is a demonstrable willingness on their part to look beyond a narrow conceptualisation of security in the maritime domain, which is solely focused on military threats and the defence of the state, towards something more comprehensive. Here the Indonesian approach to maritime security mirrors in practice conceptual trends encapsulated in the emergence of maritime security studies. More specifically, the TNA captures a general awareness of maritime security as a concept but lower awareness amongst state actors as to their specific mandate relating to maritime security. The paper also outlines the diversity of the perceived maritime security threats highlighted by state actors. Shifting to responses, the paper explores which actors are deemed to be of particular importance in relation to maritime security. It notes the continued prominence of the Navy, but notes a more complex governance situation where the role of multiple state actors and indeed non-state actors are recognised, arguing that this illustrates evidence of an acknowledgment of the relationship between insecurity at sea and on land. To conclude, the paper notes that there is the potential for a more comprehensive maritime security agenda to take hold in Indonesia but that this will require continued strategic and policy focus on the maritime domain within the country, alongside an emphasis on partnership building both within the state and between the state and non-state actors. Consistent dialogue around how maritime security is conceptualised would be particularly helpful in supporting these two conditions. Here the paper highlights the significant contribution the human security concept - with its recognition of multiple security sectors and its emphasis on core freedoms – has for those seeking a more comprehensive lens through which to approach security in the maritime domain.

Structurally the paper's next section sets out the broader context in which the Indonesia capacity-building project was established. Reiterating the emphasis placed on the maritime domain by Indonesia's President, the article positions this trajectory as an example of growing strategic thinking by those in government about the oceans and their security. This development, the paper notes, is underpinned by a broadening conceptualisation of security witnessed in recent decades, replicated in the maritime domain, where maritime security studies has emerged. With this complete the paper elaborates further on the membership of the Indonesia project's consortium, sets out the parameters of the TNA by outlining its objective and methodology, before attention turns to highlighting and discussing the main results of the TNA. It is then that conclusions are drawn.

2. New strategies and new thinking in the maritime domain

In his election manifesto in 2014 the then Indonesian Presidential candidate, Joko Widodo, promised to focus on maritime security ([29]:2–4). This commitment, encapsulated in a broad desire to transform Indonesia in to a 'global maritime axis', was subsequently affirmed in his October 2014 inauguration speech [19]. Since then the idea of Indonesia as a maritime axis has entered in to more regular parlance across government. As the General Secretary of the Ministry

of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Sjarief Widjaja, noted for example in 2015:

> "...fighting transnational crime, including people smuggling and human trafficking, is key to Indonesia's maritime security and integral to the government's design to establish Indonesia as a Global Maritime Axis" ([16]: 2).

Indonesia's renewed focus on its maritime domain represents a further example of a trend witnessed in recent years for countries and regional blocs to reflect on the maritime dimension to their development and security. The United Kingdom (UK) for example published its 'National Strategy for Maritime Security' [33] in May 2014. This strategy was signed off by four government departments – the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Ministry of Defence, and the Department of Transport – demonstrating significant cross-government engagement, and perhaps unsurprisingly in this context, the strategy embraced a multi-faceted definition of maritime security. More specifically, maritime security was defined as:

> "...the advancement and protection of the UK's national interests, at home and abroad, through the active management of risks and opportunities in and from the maritime domain, in order to strengthen and extend the UK's prosperity, security and resilience and to help shape a stable world." ([33]: 15)

The UK laid out five maritime security objectives ([33]: 9–10). These focused on securing the international maritime domain, developing maritime governance capacity, protecting overseas territories, securing global trade and energy routes, and protecting the UK and its territories against "illegal and dangerous activity, including serious organised crime and terrorism" ([33]: 10–11).

Both the European Union [8] and the African Union [1] have also published maritime security strategies in recent years, and as with the UK they encapsulate a broadening of how maritime security is conceptualised. Each strategy firmly highlights the importance of the maritime domain economically, politically, environmentally, and culturally, and as such notes more diverse threats associated with that domain. Maritime security is now about tackling issues such as illegal fishing or smuggling by sea, alongside the inter-state naval operations and broader power politics associated with the Cold War. For a country such as Indonesia, the world's largest archipelagic state, this more comprehensive agenda is relevant when, for example, tragic incidents of crime in the fishing industry are located in and around its waters.

The conceptual shift encapsulated in these maritime security strategies towards a widening and deepening of maritime security to encapsulate a growing emphasis on non-traditional threats, and the associated interest in the role of non-state actors [5], is perhaps unsurprising when we consider the broadening of the security agenda as a whole in the decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall [4,9]. It is also a shift that has been evident in academic research around maritime security where analytically rich work on the composition and deployment of 21st century navies [32], the role of the BRIC countries as emerging maritime powers [30], or on ongoing maritime territorial disputes such as those in the South China Sea [20], has been joined by an increasing array of studies looking at issues such as piracy [25,28], illegal fishing [26], how we can conceptualise port security [22] or the privatisation of maritime security [21].

There has also been a significant multi-disciplinary dimension to this expanding literature with insights from disciplines such as geography integrated in to thinking with reflections on the geopolitical dimension of maritime security [11,12] or critiques of the assumption that oceans are placeless [13]. Indeed, in recent years this proliferation of the issues under focus relating to security in the maritime domain has been met by increased efforts on a more macro-level to map out a 'maritime security studies' agenda, and establish associated academic infrastructure.[1] To date this has been a relatively organic and nascent attempt by a growing body of academics to make sense of and explore

Fig. 1. Maritime security Matrix (Source: Bueger [2]:161).

this conceptual shift simultaneously reifying it (See Fig. 1 below).

The most prominent contribution to date on the debate around maritime security studies has come from Christian Bueger. His article, 'What is Maritime Security?', places the broadening of the maritime security concept in some historical context; it rightly acknowledges that maritime security has no agreed definition and is one of the latest 'buzz words' in International Relations; and it lays out three different frameworks where conceptual commonalities and differences can be explored ([2]:159–160). In the first framework Bueger maps maritime security) in relation to other, related concepts such as seapower, the blue economy and resilience. In the second framework, Bueger draws upon the well-established securitisation framework to explore how threats to maritime security may be constructed. Finally, Bueger draws upon security practice theory to argue that studying what actors do when claiming they are enhancing maritime security can also offer insights in to the reality of maritime security. Bueger suggests that the three frameworks should be used collectively if we are to more fully explore and map the concept ([2]:160-2). It is this desire to explore and map the concept of maritime security, here in the specific context of Indonesia, which underpinned the first phase of the project and led to the development of a TNA targeted at key state maritime actors in the country. In examining the assessment's results, this paper does then contribute an additional case study through which our understanding of maritime security today is further enhanced.

3. Methodology: the training needs analysis

Before discussing the TNA's results it is appropriate to first elaborate upon how it was initiated alongside its methodology. The consortium behind the TNA emerged out of facilitating efforts, started in December 2014, by IOMIndonesia and the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) at Coventry University, to kick-start a process of reflecting on Indonesia's maritime security. This aspiration was strongly supported by the Indonesian Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP). An initial focus group discussion was organised for April 2015 in Jakarta with four universities – Coventry University, Gadjah Mada University (UGM), the University of Indonesia (UI), and the Indonesia Defence University (UNHAN) – co-convening and facilitating discussions. The objective of the first focus group discussion was broad as practitioners were brought together in order to develop policy recommendations to address maritime insecurities in the country. Here the most significant recommendations, agreed by consensus and documented in the post-event report, highlighted the undeniable need for capacity-building for maritime law enforcement and other stakeholders, as well as for the need to coordinate at a regional and international level on maritime security affairs ([15]:2).

These recommendations were given greater impetus as the trafficking and forced labour incidents in Ambon and Benjina gained increasing prominence in the media [27,31]. Here was clear evidence of the need for developing the required capacities in order to address similar incidents, whilst the transnational nature of the incidents illustrated the importance of improving coordination between all levels of governance. Against this backdrop a follow-up focus group discussion took place in September 2015 and the outcome was the establishment of a consortium where key maritime security stakeholders in Indonesia would have a platform to host further focus group discussions, develop a common understanding on maritime security issues, improve the levels of interagency cooperation, collaboration and interaction, and explore ways to facilitate knowledge transfer for joint training activities [18]. Initial membership of the consortium was diverse and included three governmental departments (Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security, and the Directorate General of Immigration); law enforcement agencies (Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), Indonesian National Police/Marine Police, Indonesia Sea and Rescue Agency, and Custom and Excise); the Indonesian Navy; academia (Gadjah Mada University (UGM), University of Indonesia (UI), and the Indonesia Defence University (UNHAN)); alongside the think tank the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

A commitment to conduct a TNA was one of the first action points of the consortium and, along with the focus group discussions convened, represented the first phase of the capacity-building project. The TNA was directed towards all relevant state maritime security institutions in Indonesia "…in order to specify prospective, priority capacity-building activities for each and every partner agency" [17]. Whilst the TNA was intended to collect data on what different actors felt their training needs were, it also sought to place those needs in context by asking respondents to reflect on the status of the maritime security threat environment and the extent of their cooperation and co-ordination with other stakeholders. Collectively the TNA would then enable the consortium to better understand how the Indonesian state thought about maritime security – threats and responses – providing data with which the most appropriate ways in which capacity might be improved could begin to be mapped. The TNA report was distributed and presented jointly by IOM/Indonesia and the CTPSR at a focus group discussion in April 2016.

The data within the TNA was collected by IOMIndonesia. This decision stemmed from the continuous physical presence of its staff in the country, as well as the availability of native language speakers who could more easily access non-English speaking Indonesian officials for data collection purposes. Through desk research ten target state actors were pinpointed as having a potential role to play in addressing the five maritime security priorities that had been highlighted by the consortium in its focus group discussions. These challenges were, in order of priority[2]:

(1) Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing,
(2) National maritime policy/strategy,
(3) Robust law enforcement/combat corruption,
(4) Smuggling in the maritime domain,
(5) Capacity-building.

The ten targeted actors meanwhile were the:

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[1] For example there has been the creation of a Maritime Security section at the WISC (2014) and the EISA (2015) annual conferences both co-ordinated by Christian Bueger (Cardiff) and James A. Malcolm (Coventry). Cardiff University runs the website www.piracy-studies.org, whilst Coventry University have launched a regular Maritime Security Briefing available online from http://www.coventry.ac.uk/marsec-briefings.

[2] Priority #2 was inclusive of a) promotion of maritime security, development of policies, and b) coherent concept of maritime security studies. Priority #5 was inclusive of: a) human resources; b) science and technology; c) institutional issues/development; d) network of stakeholders; e) pool of experts in maritime security; f) infrastructure for security and law enforcement; g) training courses in maritime security studies; h) build international/regional partnership, engaging international organisations; and i) simplify bureaucracy and rule of law [14]).

(1) Coordinating Ministry of Maritime Affairs,
(2) Coordinating Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security,
(3) Indonesian Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA),
(4) Navy (TNI AL),
(5) Indonesian National Police,
(6) Dir. Gen. Sea Transportation (Hubla),
(7) Dir. Gen. Custom and Excise (Bea and Cukai),
(8) Dir. Gen. of Immigration (Ditjenim),
(9) Ministry of Marine and Fisheries (KKP),
(10) Indonesia Sea and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS).

Data collection was conducted from November 2015 to January 2016. Questionnaires and interviews were utilised to capture insights from targeted personnel in each institution with three high ranking officials selected for interview or to write an essay, whilst questionnaires were distributed to 30 personnel in each institution. Efforts were made to target individuals who allocated resourcing within institutions for the interview/essay, whilst the questionnaires were targeted at a mixture of strategic decision makers, human resource staff, and front-line personnel within each institution. The specific options respondents could choose from in the questionnaire varied from question to question and are elaborated further in the next section of the paper. Six of the ten actors replied providing 66 questionnaires and six essays to be evaluated. These six institutions were the Indonesian National Police, the Directorate General of Immigration, the Maritime Security Agency (BAKAMLA), the co-ordinating Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security, the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), and the Indonesia Sea and Rescue Agency (BASARNAS). Whilst it is not possible therefore to argue that the TNA gives us a complete picture of the way in which the Indonesia state thinks about maritime security, the data collected does nevertheless, represent a significant leap forward in knowledge.

The paper focuses on the questionnaire results and those elements of the TNA that sought to capture respondent's views on the maritime security threat environment and current responses to insecurity as opposed to their desired training needs. As such the subsequent results section looks at how respondents understood the definition of maritime security, the actor's mandate in relation to maritime security, threats associated with the maritime domain, and what part of Indonesia's seas were deemed to be particularly vulnerable. The results section then considers which state actor respondents felt had a maritime security function, what responses to maritime insecurity were deemed relevant, and considers the role of coastal communities. The accompanying discussion of these TNA results draws upon insights on maritime security in general and in Indonesia specifically held by this paper's authors, alongside the learning attained by one of the paper's authors from their central role in co-convening the first stage of the project.

4. Results and discussion

The diversity of the actors willing to inform the focus group discussions, particularly under the aegis of an international organisation – IOMIndonesia – whose mandate is not directly related with insecurities in the maritime space, represents concrete evidence of the breadth and depth of interest in maritime security in Indonesia. With this diversity of actor in mind, the TNA sought to identify the extent to which there was a common understanding of, and approach to maritime security at the state level in Indonesia, a process that would subsequently shape planned training. Here a substantial 98% of respondents declared themselves 'fully aware', 'aware', or 'somewhat aware' of the concept of maritime security ([14]: 6). This suggests that there is strong recognition that the maritime domain is a security space. That only 2% of total respondents were confident enough to suggest they were 'fully aware' of the concept however alludes to the need for additional elaboration ([14]: 6) (See Fig. 2 below).

Indeed, whilst respondents were predominantly aware of maritime

Understanding of the Definition of Maritime Security

Fully Aware
Aware
Somewhat Aware
Not Aware

N =65

62%
35%
1% 2%

Fig. 2. Understanding Maritime security.

security as a concept, there was less confidence from these individuals about the specific role their institution had to play in relation to maritime security. 7% of respondents declared themselves 'not aware' at all about their institution's mandate, whilst a further 26% of respondents were only 'somewhat aware' of their institution's role ([14]: 9) (See Fig. 3 below).

Collectively these results emphasise that while maritime security is a buzz word that gains attention, this prominence does not necessarily mean there will be clarification across government as to its relevance in day-to-day operations. This conceptual blurring is not particularly surprising when we remind ourselves of the essentially contested nature of maritime security. Returning to Bueger, one way forward is to consider the way in which actors understand the threats associated with the maritime domain. Here the five maritime security priorities that emerged in the focus group discussions (see previous section) give an initial sense of direction with both IUU fishing and smuggling in the maritime domain deemed to be of concern. The TNA further illustrates the diversity of maritime security threats recognised by Indonesian state actors (See Fig. 4 below).

Asked to select threats from the above list, plus the options 'nothing' and 'do not know', 21% of respondents identified 'IUU fishing/intentional damage to the marine environment' as a predominant threat, the highest response. 'Piracy and armed robbery' was the threat selected by 19% of respondents and sat in second position. This highlights the way in which a variety of non-traditional threats sit alongside each other in the concerns of Indonesian state institutions. This mix is further emphasised when we consider that 17% of respondents flagged up 'smuggling and trafficking of persons' by sea


Institutional Mandate on Maritime Security

7% 10%
26%
57%

N =61

Fully Aware   Aware   Somewhat Aware   Not Aware

Fig. 3. Institutional maritime security mandate.

Predominant Maritime Security Threats

N = 66

- Piracy and Armed Robbery
- Terrorist Act
- Offshore installations
- Illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction
- Illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances
- Smuggling and trafficking of persons
- IUU fishing

Fig. 4. Maritime security threats in Indonesia.

as a predominant threat, and 12% flagged up 'terrorist acts' involving ships.

To probe further the maritime security environment, respondents were also asked to reflect on the geographic priority areas selecting between the 'territorial sea', 'Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)' and 'maritime boundaries'. Whilst most respondents (35%) felt the 'territorial sea' was the highest priority, the results were balanced with 33% selecting the 'EEZ', and 29% 'maritime boundaries'. This alludes to the high politics often associated with any sense of border, but recognises that those waters closer to land and thus the wider population, remain of principal concern. It also highlights awareness on the part of respondents to the interconnectedness of maritime security threats and their often transnational character (See Fig. 5 below).

This complex threat perception picture in Indonesia is unsurprising when we consider the scale and diversity of the country's maritime domain. With more than 17,500 islands to be policed and secured for example [24], and the associated challenges this has for maritime domain awareness and interdiction activities, it seems of little surprise that respondents would recognise a whole host of potential threats that exploit this vast space.

Shifting our emphasis on to how Indonesian state actors think about responses to maritime insecurity, the TNA provides further insights. When asked to reflect on which state actor, beyond their own, held the most important maritime security function in the country the 'Navy' was the most popular choice with 41% of respondents selecting it. This suggests that its prominence and influence within Indonesia is at such a level that other actors recognise its centrality. With non-traditional security threats focused upon in the TNA, the role of the Navy as a military body is something requiring more research. Beyond the Navy, four other actors representing a mixture of political and security actors were highlighted by respondents. Of further interest was that neither the 'Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries' nor the 'IUU

Agencies that Hold the Most Important Function

N =46

- Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs
- Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs
- Indonesian Coast Guard (Bakamla)
- Navy
- Indonesian National Police
- Do not know

Fig. 6. Maritime security agencies.

Fishing Task Force' were selected by respondents despite being included in the list of options. While respondents were only asked to select the actor which held the most important maritime security function, IUU fishing's prominence as a perceived threat might have suggested a higher profile here (See Fig. 6 below).

There was recognition amongst the TNA respondents of the need to look beyond the state. When asked to reflect on the most important actors within coastal communities, 43% of respondents selected 'tribal leaders in the fishing communities', with 31% selecting 'fishermen' themselves ([14]:13) (See Fig. 7 below).

This emphasis on the fishing industry is not particularly surprising when we acknowledge the prominent people trafficking incidents on foreign fishing vessels that had garnered significant attention in Indonesia. The results do though represent some acknowledgement from state representatives that non-state actors may be referent objects of maritime security and play a role in responding to insecurity. Whilst local distinctiveness must always to be taken into account, the role of

MS Territorial Waters Priority

N =48

- Territorial sea
- Exclusive Economic Zone/EEZ
- Maritime Boundaries
- Do not know

Fig. 5. Prioritisation of maritime space.

The Most Important Actors within the Coastal Communities

N = 54

- Community Leaders
- Religious Leaders
- Tribal leader in Fishing Community
- Fishermen

Fig. 7. Key maritime security actors in civil society.

local tribal leaders' within coastal communities for example, and their ability to garner support from community members, makes them an invaluable resource in combating transnational organised crime at the local level. Coastal communities understand their local environment best, and if they are engaged appropriately by state maritime security agencies, providing information on say, suspicious activity, a stronger security picture can be attained. It is a similar situation at sea where local fishermen may also have a unique insight into IUU fishing activities and other maritime security issues in their fishing grounds ([14]:12). The emphasis on engaging with coastal communities also highlights recognition that the sea is not a hermetically sealed space, but rather insecurity at sea can stem from and find succour on land, alongside negatively impacting the wellbeing of innocent citizens.

5. Conclusion

The TNA provides a valuable glimpse in to how the concept of maritime security has been understood and utilised in practice by the Indonesian state. Although it is sensible not to over-claim from a single data set, the analysis of the TNA's results in this paper has been shaped by nearly two years of insights about maritime security in Indonesia gained through the establishment of the consortium, and the delivery of the focus group discussions. The TNA highlights that the Indonesian state, driven forward by the maritime focus of its President, is increasingly recognising the importance of maritime security. Here prominent incidents of maritime crime such as those in Ambon and Benjina have undoubtedly given this emphasis more impetus. Beyond the recognition of the human suffering that such insecurities facilitate, for the Indonesian state they also have illustrated the inter-connected and transnational nature of maritime security. As the Indonesian Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, stated:

"One of the reasons I prioritize the eradication of illegal fishing is not only because we are losing trillions of rupiah due to illegal fishing, but also because illegal fishing is often a vehicle for other crimes, such as people smuggling, drugs smuggling and slavery" ([16]:1).

Taken alongside the diversity of maritime security threats highlighted in the TNA, and coupled with the acknowledgement of the role coastal communities can play; it seems clear that the early signs of a comprehensive maritime security agenda are evident in Indonesia. This mirrors broader conceptual developments where the widening and deepening of maritime security beyond military threats and the state has taken place, and the links between maritime security and other concepts such as sustainable development have begun to be explored [10,23].

Whether this more comprehensive maritime security agenda will take hold and become more institutionalised in Indonesia is difficult to tell. The lack of clarity over which institutions had a maritime security mandate serves as a reminder that the strategic and policy focus on the maritime domain within Indonesia must be communicated across government long term. The TNA's recognition that the Navy remains the state actor with highest prominence in the maritime security field; and an acknowledgement that there is a difference between recognising the role coastal communities can play and actually moving towards exploring and facilitating that, all suggests caution is needed. An emphasis on partnership building both within the state and between the state and non-state actors is likely to be important. Parts of the TNA not analysed in this paper do suggest that inter-agency co-operation exists both formally and informally between state actors ([14]:13–23). Consistent dialogue about maritime security and the use of common conceptual frameworks between actors would be beneficial. Here the human security concept is particularly helpful in enhancing our understanding of the comprehensive maritime security agenda.

Championed with such enthusiasm by the United Nations in the early 1990's [34], human security's emergence came against the backdrop of increased recognition of the diversification of threats away from an emphasis on the nuclear threats of the Cold War to the standards of everyday living, human dignity, freedom, equality, justice and safety from threats such as lack of food, a lack of medicine, poverty and the nefarious constraints that affect everyday life [7,34]. Human security's emphasis on the individual as referent object of security enables us to better recognise community formations by these individuals above and below the state level. Its use of seven core sectors such as food, health or environmental security allows us to deconstruct and compartmentalise the totality of human relations and experience for analytical purposes, before re-aggregation enables us to more confidently evaluate the level of human security witnessed. While human security's collective interest in freedom from fear, want and indignity demands that we recognise and explore the nexus between human experience on land and at sea, pushing us towards an examination of the causes of maritime insecurity, alongside its symptoms.[3] It is a conceptual framework then well suited to explore and underpin Indonesia's maritime security capacity-building efforts.

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